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Abstract
Volcanic crises are complex and especially challenging to manage.
Volcanic unrest is characterised by uncertainty about whether an eruption
will or will not take place, as well as its possible location, size and
evolution. Planning is further complicated by the range of potential
hazards and the variety of disciplines involved in forecasting and
responding to volcanic emergencies. Effective management is favoured
at frequently active volcanoes, owing to the experience gained through the
repeated ‘testing’ of systems of communication. Even when plans have
not been ofﬁcially put in place, the groups involved tend to have an
understanding of their roles and responsibilities and those of others. Such
experience is rarely available at volcanoes that have been quiescent for
several generations. Emergency responses are less effective, not only
because of uncertainties about the volcanic system itself, but also because
scientists, crisis directors, managers and the public are inexperienced in
volcanic unrest. In such situations, tensions and misunderstandings result
in poor communication and have the potential to affect decision making
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and delay vital operations. Here we compare experiences on communi-
cating information during crises on volcanoes reawakening after long
repose (El Hierro in the Canary Islands) and in frequent eruption (Etna and
Stromboli in Sicily). The results provide a basis for enhancing commu-
nication protocols during volcanic emergencies.
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1 Introduction
Volcanic crises are complex to manage, owing to
uncertainty in the behaviour of volcanoes and of
the people and organisations responding to an
emergency. Complexity is especially acute at
volcanoes showing unrest after long intervals of
repose, from several decades to centuries. In such
cases, the infrequency of eruptions, and conse-
quent lack of data on the volcanic system, intro-
duces a high level of uncertainty in forecasts of
eruptions and their hazards. In addition, few if
any of the responding authorities—from moni-
toring scientists to civil protection agencies and
governmental bodies—may have had direct
experience of volcanic behaviour. As a result,
prepared response plans are either non-existent or
tend to be based on generic procedures designed
to cover the legal requirements established by the
host country for such contingencies. The different
authorities may also have been brought together
for the ﬁrst time to address an emergency. In
combination, inexperience in the scientiﬁc and
managerial aspects of a crisis, the absence of a
speciﬁc response plan and the lack of previous
interaction between scientists and emergency
managers (and even between scientists of differ-
ent disciplines) can produce levels of tension
among personnel that impair communications
between key responders and the quality and
timing of the decisions being made (Fiske 1984;
Voight 1988a, 1990; Aspinall et al. 2002; Solana
and Spiller 2007; Solana et al. 2008; Barclay et al.
2008; McGuire et al. 2009).
The notion to establish professional guidelines
for responding to volcanic emergencies has been
discussed since at least the 1970s (Tazieff 1977;
Bostok 1978; Sigvaldason 1978; Barberi and
Gasparini 1979; Fiske 1979; Tomblin 1979). Two
decades later, the International Association of
Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth’s Interior
(IAVCEI) published a set of recommendations for
the conduct of scientists during volcanic crises
(IAVCEI et al. 1999). The recommendations
emphasized that emergency responses are opti-
mized by effective teamwork and the presentation
by scientists to non-specialists of a uniﬁed and
objective evaluation of volcanic unrest and its
possible outcomes. Although appealing in theory,
the recommendations are not binding and have
been followed only erratically in practice. An
example is the response to the 2011–1012 eruption
of El Hierro, in the Canary Islands, which occurred
after more than 200 years of repose. Following the
El Hierro crisis, the Spanish Civil Protection
agency identiﬁed the need to develop protocols to
enable better communication of information
between scientists and with emergency responders
and local governmental agencies and argued that
these should be integrated into regional emergency
planning. This paper presents the experience
gained during the crisis and describes how proto-
cols have been designed and the factors that have
hindered their development. It also highlights good
practice and the importance of building on the
experience gained from communicating informa-
tion about eruptions at frequently active volcanoes,
using emergencies from Etna and Stromboli.
2 M.C. Solana et al.
2 Communications During
a Volcanic Crisis
Good communication plays a key role in
managing a volcanic emergency effectively
(Peterson 1988; Tilling 1989; Solana and Spiller
2007; Solana et al. 2008; McGuire et al. 2009;
Doyle et al. 2011). Three common obstacles to
good communication are: (1) differences in the
organisational cultures with which responders are
familiar (2) uncertainty in forecasting volcanic
behaviour, and (3) inexperience of addressing
volcanic unrest. The potential of these factors to
diminish efﬁcient communication is rarely
appreciated before an emergency begins and this,
in turn, favours poor decisions being made under
the conditions of high stress during volcanic
unrest (McGuire et al. 2009).
2.1 Organisational Cultures
Emergency responses normally require collabo-
ration between academic scientists and the civil
authorities. These two groups work in institu-
tions with contrasting organisational cultures.
As identiﬁed by Handy (1978), academics, sci-
entists and researchers have primarily individu-
alistic personalities. Their association in groups
(e.g., universities, research centres or teams) is
commonly for personal convenience and to
facilitate the advance of individuals in their ﬁeld
of study. Academics do not “willingly take
orders […] or compromise on their own plans”
(Handy 1978, p. 39) and are rarely forced to do
so by their organisations (Handy 1978). As a
result, academic decisions on, for example, the
amount and type of information to be commu-
nicated during an emergency, normally have to
be agreed on an individual basis. This process,
although democratic, makes management and
decision making through consensus very difﬁ-
cult and time consuming. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the key recommendations of
IAVCEI et al. (1999)—to value different
expertises and approaches equally, to share
information and logistical resources and to work
as a team that speaks with a single voice and
rewards self-sacriﬁce—are not always adopted
by individuals during emergencies, especially
those without previous experience of a volcanic
crisis. This was illustrated by an informal sur-
vey in 2013 among participants of an interna-
tional project on volcanic unrest in Europe and
Latin-America (Fig. 1). The 21 interviewees
represented 12 countries and scientists with
different levels of seniority, 15 of which had
experience responding or being involved
directly or indirectly in 3 or more volcanic
crisis. Of these 21 experts, 13 recognised per-
sonal ego and individual interests as the main
barriers to communications between scientists
during volcanic emergencies (Fig. 1).
The individualistic attitudes of many aca-
demic scientists contrast sharply with the culture
of the civil authorities who are in charge of a
crisis. Emergency managers are typically civil
servants who work in a hierarchy designed to
help their organisation achieve its goals. Indi-
vidual ideas are rarely expressed except as part of
agreed policy (Handy 1978). Managers are thus
used to responding to information that has
already been agreed by expert advisers and are
usually reluctant to engage in evaluating
diverging opinions or uncertainty in forecasts of
a volcano’s behaviour (Solana et al. 2008).
Academic debate may therefore be perceived as
indecision among experts and so raise questions
about the quality of scientiﬁc advice being
received. As a result, essential information from
the advising scientists may not be communicated
effectively to the emergency managers.
2.2 Uncertainty
Expressions of uncertainty may be perceived as
indecision and so hinder the communication of
scientiﬁc information. A common example is the
delivery of eruption forecasts. Forecasts contain
numerous sources of uncertainty because of the
natural variations in the behaviour of magmatic
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systems Marzocchi et al. (2012) and incomplete
understanding of a speciﬁc volcano (e.g. Doyle
et al. 2014) or incomplete data sets from research
monitoring networks, especially emergency net-
works installed after the ﬁrst signs of unrest. Even
when appropriate monitoring is in place, uncer-
tainty remains as to whether unrest will lead to an
eruption or intrusion, because both are associated
with similar changes in precursory signal (Tilling
1989). Such uncertainty is compounded when
monitoring data are contradictory (e.g., increases
in geochemical indicators which do not correlate
with seismic or deformation data) and can lead to
critical delays in forecasting and decision making
with fatal consequences, as seen in Mt. Ontake in
Japan, where a sudden eruption in September 27,
2014 surprised scientists monitoring the volcano
and killed 23 people (Oskin 2014). Eruptions may
also occur without detected precursory unrest,
such as the so-called “silent” 2004 eruption at
Mount Etna in Sicily (Burton et al. 2005) and the
“passive” eruptions described for Kilauea in
Hawaii (Bell and Kilburn 2011).
To aid the communication of uncertainty,
several methodologies have been developed for
evaluating the probabilities of an eruption,
including Bayesian statistics and expert elicita-
tion (e.g. Newhall and Hoblitt 2002; Aspinall
et al. 2003; Marti et al. 2008; Marzocchi et al.
2008; Marzocchi and Bebbington 2012; Sobra-
delo et al. 2015), as well as the incorporation of
deterministic models (Voight 1988b; Kilburn and
Voight 1998; De La Cruz-Reyna and
Reyes-Davila 2001; Kilburn 2003, 2012). On
their own, however, probabilities are open to
different interpretations by scientists and civil
authorities and agreement on its meaning might
not be reached.
As discussed by Doyle et al. (2011), com-
municating information does not necessarily
have to imply that a consensus has been reached
or that uncertainty is lacking, but it is imperative
that all such issues are conveyed using appro-
priate language and with an understanding of the
scientiﬁc culture of groups involved in advising
decision makers. Thus, the civil authorities can
favour methods other than probabilities for
receiving forecasts (Solana et al. 2008), such as
preferred time windows (Swanson et al. 1983),
precursory scenarios and comparison with
uncertainties associated with events that are
locally more familiar. Overall, information will
Fig. 1 Results from an informal survey of 21 volcanol-
ogists during the “Scientiﬁc advice, decision-making and
risk communication” Vuelco meeting in 2013 (Solana and
Fearnley 2013). Left, “Personal aspects” include person-
ality, ego, personal interest, visibility, status.
“Scientiﬁc/academic aspects” include ownership of data,
publishing pressure, career progression. “Institutional
aspects” include legal frameworks of institutions,
institutional status and agreed responsibilities. “Others”
include lack of experience, uncertainty, culture, discipline
rivalry. Right, Aspects of personal interaction include
frequent face to face contact, joint experience in crisis,
moderator/expert elicitation methods, grouping all teams
together. Legal framework aspects include legalised
protocols or rules, pre-agreements for data sharing
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generally be more effectively communicated
when presented in a form preferred by the
recipient rather than imposed by the sender.
2.3 Inexperience
Lack of experience compounds poor communi-
cation due to different organisational cultures and
the presentation of scientiﬁc information. Expe-
rience is gained not only through repeated expo-
sure to volcanic unrest, but also by learning from
mistakes. Admitting that mistakes have been
made tends to be associated with failure and so not
to be recorded. Notable exceptions reflecting on
the management of volcanic crisis are Voight
(1988a, 1990) on Nevado del Ruiz, Fiske (1984)
on St. Vincent and Guadeloupe or Aspinall et al.
(2002) in Montserrat. Reluctant recording is
especially damaging to responses at volcanoes
reawakening after long repose where the inherent
uncertainty on the behaviour of volcanic system is
highest. By virtue of the long repose intervals, few
teams or individuals have the opportunity to
respond more than once to such an emergency
during their professional careers. The beneﬁt of
experience strongly depends, therefore, on pub-
lished accounts of previous events. When
accounts focus only on the successful aspects of a
response, a false impression may be conveyed that
mistakes are rare; and teams may also minimise
the role played by good fortune rather than clear
judgement Newhall and Punongbayan (1996). As
a result, inexperienced teams may undervalue the
potential difﬁculties in responding to an emer-
gency and so unnecessarily repeat mistakes from
the past. Global circumstances today are particu-
larly acute, given the gap of nearly 25 years since
the last large, VEI 6 eruption (Pinatubo in 1991)
and more than 30 years has elapsed since the last
volcanic disaster involving tens of thousands of
deaths Chester et al. (2000) i.e. the 1984 eruption
of Nevado del Ruiz in Colombia (Voight 1990).
Based on statistics from the past 200 years (Sie-
bert et al. 2010), at least half the volcanoes in
eruption during the next century are expected to
reawaken after a repose interval of 100 years or
more. The scientists and ofﬁcials responsible for
managing an emergency will have no experience
of the particular volcano’s behaviour and, possi-
bly, little or no direct experience of responding to
volcanic eruptions in general.
The 2011–2012 unrest and eruption of El
Hierro illustrates how communication during an
emergency can be hampered by inexperience,
organisational culture and forecasting uncertainty
Marrero et al. (2015), Carracedo et al. (2015). This
example is compared below with methods that
have been developed at Italy’s frequently-erupting
volcanoes Etna and Stromboli. Together, the case
studies indicate best-practice methods for main-





of El Hierro, Canary Islands
Since the 1990s, the Canary Islands have been
recognised as a high-risk volcanic area by the
international scientiﬁc community. In particular,
Mt Teide on Tenerife was selected as a
UN-IDNDR decade volcano as well as a EU
laboratory volcano. Nevertheless, the long return
period of eruptions has encouraged a low per-
ception of volcanic risk among national and local
authorities and, hence, a reactive attitude to
planning for volcanic emergencies is also evi-
dent. An indication of the low priority given to
the threat of volcanic activity has been the gov-
ernment’s under-investment in a multidisci-
plinary monitoring system for volcanic activity
(Marti et al. 2009). For example, despite a gen-
eral scientiﬁc call for an appropriate monitoring
network during the 2004 seismo-volcanic crisis
on Tenerife (Salomone 2004), little was invested
until the 2011 unrest at El Hierro, when a com-
prehensive geophysical network was deployed
there (López et al. 2012). Initiatives to rationalise
and coordinate volcanic research in the region
have also lacked economic support. For example,
the creation of a comprehensive Volcanological
Institute on the Canaries was demanded by the
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Spanish Senate in 2005, the Parliament of the
Canaries in 2006 and the Spanish Congress in
2009; even so, the only initiative to produce an
open and inclusive research group on the islands
received only limited funding from the local
council in Tenerife and had instead to be created
as a commercial entity.
The lack of preparedness was highlighted in
2011, when El Hierro, the westernmost and
youngest island in the Canaries, entered eruption
in October for the ﬁrst time in recorded history. It
was also the ﬁrst eruption in the Canaries in
40 years. After four months of low magnitude
seismic activity frequently felt by the population,
together with enhanced diffuse emissions of CO2
and H2S (Pérez et al. 2012) and continuous sur-
face and ground deformation which reached a
maximum of 5 cm (López et al. 2012), an
eruption was conﬁrmed off the island’s southern
coast (Fig. 2). Being submarine, the eruption did
not cause personal or material damage, but had
an important impact on the small local businesses
as well as causing anxiety and insecurity to some
of the local population, as is clear on the con-
cerns voiced in the media and directly through
the digital version of the local newspaper, Diario
del Hierro (www.diarioelhierro.com).
The legal context of the Canary Islands is
important in framing some of the scientiﬁc issues
that arose during the crisis. Although constitu-
tional relationships between metropolitan Spain
and the Canaries (and Spanish law more
generally) are complex and beyond the scope of
the present paper, a general statement of the key
issues is presented next. The Canary Islands are a
region of Spain with a special political status
which allows them a level of self-determination
and government in many areas of policy. The
Civil Protection is one of the organisations with
relative independence and can plan for and man-
age local and regional emergencies, though within
an overall framework of laws approved by the
central Spanish Government. Despite legislation
requesting a speciﬁc plan for volcanic emergen-
cies in Canaries since 1996, the ﬁrst protocol to
respond to an emergency was created as a
response to the seismo-volcanic crisis of 2004 in
Tenerife (Salomone 2004; PEVOLCA 2010).
Within this legal framework, in 2008 the
Canarian Civil Protection produced a plan for
volcanic emergencies known as PEVOLCA, Plan
de Emergencias Volcanicas de Canarias (Vol-
canic Emergencies Plan for the Canaries). The
plan was approved in 2010 and established
which groups would form the scientiﬁc advisory
committee and their roles and responsibilities.
The original 2004 protocol recommended that
the scientiﬁc committee be comprised of repre-
sentatives from most of the local and national
scientiﬁc institutions involved in volcanic
research and monitoring in the Canaries. How-
ever, the 2010 PEVOLCA plan instead estab-
lished a scientiﬁc advisory committee consisting
of the National Geographical Institute (IGN), the
Fig. 2 The island of El
Hierro, its position within the
Canary Islands (inset) and the
location of the offshore 2011
eruption (star). The village of
La Restinga (pop. 600) is
marked with an open circle
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Spanish National Research Centre (CSIC), the
National Meteorological Agency (AEMET) and
the Civil Protection. This selection created much
ill feeling amongst local scientiﬁc institutions,
which could only participate in the scientiﬁc
advisory committee meetings by invitation. It
also had important implications for the local
groups, which, in the absence of a formal role
during the emergency, were left in a vulnerable
legal position when their staff provided scientiﬁc
advice and, without speciﬁc funding, were placed
in ﬁnancial difﬁculty when participating in
committee meetings.
When the PEVOLCA plan was activated dur-
ing the 2011–2012 El Hierro emergency, the Civil
Protection invited all the principal volcanological
research groups to the scientiﬁc advisory com-
mittee. It soon became apparent that the groups
were not readily sharing all the available data, so
the Civil Protection authority was eventually
forced to act as a mediator. Independently-funded
institutions and also groups funded through
research projects argued that their data were not
public and did not belong to the State. Ill feeling
also developed because of the lack of access to
resources, such as boats and helicopters for
monitoring, and also data: for example, the
establishment of an exclusion zone including the
eruption site and its surroundings, meant that
regular sampling was much easier for members of
the Scientiﬁc Advisory Committee than it was for
other groups. The six-month duration of the crisis
also highlighted differences in funding between
the formal monitoring group (IGN), that could
rely on public funds for their continuous presence
on the island and other monitoring groups, which
struggled to meet their overheads.
In addition to the PEVOLCA scientists,
researchers from other national and international
research organisations temporarily joined in
monitoring, sampling and research and some
occasionally publicized their opinions in the
local and national media. Although the majority
of opinions were not especially controversial,
some of the more speculative comments on the
potential evolution of the crisis and the eruption,
did create concern within the scientiﬁc groups
who had followed the crisis from the beginning




Recent Eruptions of Etna
and Stromboli, Italy
Frequently eruptions at a volcano favour the
development of reliable monitoring and efﬁcient
communications among scientists, the Civil Pro-
tection and the public. Etna and Stromboli
(Fig. 3a), for example, have permanent, multi-
disciplinary monitoring systems which enable
precursory signals to be detected and recognised
well in advance of an eruption (Bonaccorso et al.
2004; Patané et al. 2004; Puglisi et al. 2004;
Martini et al. 2007; Bertolaso et al. 2008a, b;
Rizzo et al. 2008; Tarchi et al. 2008; Calvari et al.
2010, 2011; Di Traglia et al. 2014). In addition,
the responsibilities of the monitoring scientists
have been clearly identiﬁed by the Italian
Government and Civil Protection authorities. The
latter funds monitoring networks and has frequent
direct contact with the scientists in charge of
coordinating the monitoring (Bertolaso et al.
2008b).
Legal responsibility for volcano and earth-
quake monitoring in Italy rests with the INGV
(Istituto Nazionale di Geoﬁsica e Vulcanologia).
The Civil Protection (DPC, Dipartimento della
Protezione Civile) funds not just the INGV, but
also university teams that may duplicate or
complement the data collected by the INGV. The
university teams (called Centri di Competenza or
Centres of Expertise) share data and ideas with
the INGV and DPC during volcanic crises.
Although the number of university personnel is
much smaller than for the INGV (several tens
compared with 800), the duplication of data from
different teams allows alternative interpretations
that encourages a more complete view of the
phenomena being monitored. During the last
ﬁfteen years, implementation of this system has
produced well-established and efﬁcient manage-
ment procedures for responding to crises at both
Etna and Stromboli (Bertolaso et al. 2008b;
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Fig. 3 a Google Map displaying southern Italy, with
Stromboli volcano (red circle) at the NE end of the
Aeolian Archipelago, and Etna volcano just N of Catania,
on the East flank of Sicily. The yellow square displays the
area magniﬁed in b. b Google map of the eastern flank of
Etna volcano, comprising the summit craters, the Valle
del Bove depression with the 1991–1993 lava flow ﬁeld
(in red), and the position of Zafferana Etnea town. The
white dotted line at the end of the lava flow ﬁeld shows
the position of the earth dam built up in January 1992.
The yellow square displays the area magniﬁed in
c. c View from East of Etna’s eastern flank displaying
the Summit Craters, the Valle del Bove, and the position
of Zafferana town. Photo by Alﬁo Amantia, taken from
helicopter on 23 December 1991, a few days after the start
of the eruption. The yellow square displays the area
magniﬁed in d. d Photo by Alﬁo Amantia, taken from
helicopter on 5 January 1992, showing the earth dam built
up at the exit of the Valle del Bove, with several trucks
working on its top, and a large lava flow approaching to it
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Bonaccorso et al. 2015). Even under such
favourable conditions, however, communications
during a crisis can be very challenging when a
population is directly threatened, as illustrated by
the 1991–1993 eruption on Etna (Barberi and
Villari 1994; Calvari et al. 1994) and the 2002–
2003 activity on Stromboli (Calvari et al. 2005,
2006; Bertolaso et al. 2008a).
When the safety of people is involved, con-
siderable pressure is placed on the scientists from
both the population and government agencies,
speciﬁcally to analyse data and provide infor-
mation and forecasts quickly, which diminishes
both productivity and efﬁciency. Data sharing
and discussion of differing interpretations is of
paramount importance, but the scientiﬁc com-
munity and Civil Protection must provide an
agreed interpretation if they are to keep the trust
of the population. The 1991–1993 flank eruption
at Etna volcano (Fig. 3b) produced the largest
compound lava flow ﬁeld of the last three cen-
turies, with *250 million m3 of lava being
emplaced along the southern margin of the bar-
ren Valle del Bove (VDB) on the eastern flank of
the volcano (Calvari et al. 1994; Stevens et al.
1997). From there it approached the village of
Zafferana Etnea (Fig. 3b, c), about 9 km from the
eruptive ﬁssure (Calvari et al. 1994). The erup-
tion started on 14 December 1991 and, after an
initial effusive phase during which the lava
rapidly spread within the VDB, the Government
decided to build an earthen barrier, 21 m high
and 234 m long, across a narrow exit from the
valley (Fig. 3b–d) in order to conﬁne the lava
and protect Zafferana Etnea (Barberi and Villari
1994). The barrier was completed on January 1st
1992 (Barberi and Villari 1994, Fig. 3d) and
worked effectively for three months until April
7th 1992. However, the growth of lava tubes
within the lava flow ﬁeld signiﬁcantly increased
the potential of the lava to spread down slope
(Calvari and Pinkerton 1998), and resulted in
lava piling up behind and then spilling over the
barrier to advance towards Zafferana Etnea
(Calvari et al. 1994; Calvari and Pinkerton 1998).
At this stage, the people of Zafferana Etnea
were seriously concerned for their safety, because
they could observe the lava flows advancing
towards their homes, less than 2 km away. Mis-
trust of the authorities spread among the popula-
tion, especially when the ﬁrst attempts to divert
the lava (initially carried out at the lower end of
the lava flow ﬁeld) were unsuccessful. This was
reinforced by the attention given by the local and
national media to differing opinions expressed by
scientists and Civil Protection ofﬁcials over the
best solutions to apply to divert the lava. Dis-
agreements were ampliﬁed by the media, thus
increasing suspicions, doubts and distrust (Bar-
beri and Villari 1994). The population exerted
pressure through their elected representatives to
halt attempts for changing the course of the lava
(e.g., with the use of bombs and destruction of
forests) and public trust started to return only after
daily meetings between scientists and the popu-
lation were organised, with additional informa-
tion being released by radio and television
(Barberi et al. 1993; Barberi and Villari 1994;
Barberi and Carapezza 2004). At the daily
meetings the scientists explained “step by step”
and justiﬁed what they were doing (Barberi and
Villari 1994). Strangely, trust in and esteem for
the scientists did not grow even when the safety
of Zafferana Etnea was assured by the successful
diversion of lava from a location closer to the
eruptive ﬁssure, because the attention of the
media by then had already moved on to other,
more dramatic topics (Barberi and Villari 1994),
so highlighting the important role of the media in
influencing public perception.
Ten years later, during a major flank eruption
in 2002–2003, information to both the media and
the population were communicated, not only by
radio and television, but also through the internet,
where maps, reports, photos and data were con-
tinually updated. The collaboration between sci-
entists working for different institutions and
universities (even from different countries)
proved essential to understand and model erup-
tive processes, mitigate risks and obtain the best
possible results (Bonaccorso et al. 2015). Fol-
lowing this eruption, a key priority was to pro-
duce prompt hazard assessment and develop
expertise in the modelling of lava flows within the
INGV. This was achieved through projects fun-
ded by the Italian Government and the DPC.
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Since then, communities on Etna have become
involved in the monitoring effort by reporting
information on any ash fall to the monitoring
room of the INGV’s Etna Observatory in Catania.
They have also been invited to collaborate with
ash sampling, thus allowing a unique and exten-
sive sample collection of the several lava fountain
episodes spreading ash over a large area (*30 km
wide and over 200 km long) on and beyond the
eastern flank of the volcano (Andronico et al.
2008). This collaboration has increased public
understanding of eruptive events and served to
increase trust in the work of scientists.
During Etna’s 2002–2003 eruption, the INGV
had simultaneously to face a volcanic crisis at
Stromboli, the most active of the Aeolian Islands
about 60 km to the north (Fig. 3a). The start of
this eruption was marked by a tsunami that
injured three people and caused damage along the
coastal area of the island (Tinti et al. 2003). The
tsunami was triggered by submarine and subaerial
landslides (Bonaccorso et al. 2003) and was soon
followed by the opening of an eruptive ﬁssure
with lava flowing down the north flank of the
island to the sea for several months (Calvari et al.
2005). While lava was still pouring out from the
ﬁssure, the summit crater produced a very large
explosion (Calvari et al. 2006; Bonaccorso et al.
2012) that damaged houses and buildings in
nearby villages and triggered ﬁres on vegetated
slopes. The Civil Protection responded rapidly,
building an observatory (COA, Centro Operativo
Avanzato) where all the monitoring signals from
the INGV and other universities were received
(Bertolaso et al. 2008a). These monitoring net-
works were greatly expanded and improved using
special ﬁnancial support from the Civil Protection
Authority. Daily meetings were organized
between academic and INGV scientists and the
Civil Protection to enable data comparison and
sharing, and this resulted in a much deeper
understanding of the volcanic activity (Calvari
et al. 2008). The knowledge of the volcanic sys-
tem was also greatly improved because of the
funds and research projects initiated by the DPC
(Bertolaso et al. 2008a). Since the monitoring of
Stromboli was shared between INGV and other
institutions, such as the Universities of Florence
and Rome (Bertolaso et al. 2008a), the commu-
nication of scientiﬁc results to the population and
the media was strictly controlled by the Civil
Protection in order to avoid disseminating diver-
gent or contrasting points of view.
When the eruption started, 400 inhabitants
were informed of the possibility of tsunamis, and
330 spontaneously decided to leave the island.
Access to the island was temporarily denied,
except to monitoring scientists, volcanological
guides, The Civil Protection and authorized
journalists. Although implemented for safety
reasons, the exclusion created ill feelings
amongst a team of academic scientists not
involved in monitoring, who were prevented
access for sampling the erupted products. The
Italian Civil Protection addressed this problem by
sharing a number of samples between the mon-
itoring and the academic teams. The population
returned of their own accord two months later,
and within three months from the start of the
eruption the island was reopened to tourists.
Initially, a conflict between the local popula-
tion and the media arose, caused by the fear that
dramatic information on the activity of this vol-
cano would scare away tourists and damage the
local economy (Bertolaso et al. 2008a). To
maintain a high level of awareness of volcanic
hazards amongst the local population and to
provide guidance on personal safety, the DPC
has since annually published and distributed
leaflets before the start of the tourist season.
However, this basic information has not been
welcomed by the whole of the local population,
again because of concerns of reducing tourism.
4 General Aspects
of the Development of a Protocol
for the Communication,
Management and Use
of Scientific Information During
Volcanic Emergencies in Canaries
The experience gained at Etna, Stromboli and El
Hierro reinforce the ﬁndings from other volca-
noes (e.g., Peterson 1988; Tilling 1989; Solana
et al. 2008; McGuire et al. 2009; Doyle et al.
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2011) that clear procedures for the sharing, dis-
cussion and communication of scientiﬁc infor-
mation are crucial for the effective management
of volcanic emergencies, especially on volcanoes
with long periods of repose, where uncertainty
about the volcanic systems are greatest.
In the Canaries, the Civil Protection has pro-
posed that a new Scientiﬁc Committee for the
Assessment and Surveillance of Volcanic
Phenomena (CSEV) be created as an inclusive
committee for the study and analysis of
seismo-volcanic risk. This committee will be
coordinated by the Civil Protection and consist of
representatives from each of the groups within
the formal advisory committee of PEVOLCA, as
well as from each of the local universities and
research centres. External advisors may also be
appointed at the discretion of the coordinator.
CSEV’s aims and objectives are:
• to identify possible precursory phenomena to
eruptions in the Canary Islands;
• to assess data obtained from monitoring net-
works and instruments;
• to produce forecasts of volcanic activity and
the consequences for the Civil Protection
Authorities;
• to establish a methodology for monitoring
during volcanic eruptions, for evaluating data
and for formulating hypotheses about the
likelihood and potential impact of an
eruption.
To avoid the difﬁculties encountered during
the El Hierro crisis, CSEV has further established
a series of regulations that must be satisﬁed for
participation:
• the requirement to sign an agreement to obey
the rules of the committee;
• the use of information and data must be
shared by committee members exclusively to
advise the Civil Protection (and not for per-
sonal or institutional gain);
• the selection of one representative from each
group by democratic procedures;
• compulsory attendance at sessions of the
committee;
• the need to produce and submit written
reports two days before scheduled meetings
with information on forecasts, eruption sce-
narios and their associated probabilities;
• following debate and discussion of data, the
need to reach a consensus and produce a
written document on the situation or, if a
consensus is not reached, the basis for dif-
ferent interpretations should be clearly noted
and explained;
• conﬁdentiality and coordination in the dis-
semination of information about the results
and of debates held within meetings.
5 Discussion
The challenges and successes presented in this
paper emphasize the varied nature of communi-
cation problems that have been encountered in
recent crises and the lessons that can be learned.
A summary of selected information from these
crises is presented in Table 1.
The eruption of El Hierro in 2011 provided
the best possible scenario for an eruption from
the management point of view. The eruption
occurred offshore, meaning that no lives were
seriously threatened or property damaged; it
affected a sparsely populated area (El Hierro has
a population of ca. 10,000, the smallest in the
Canary Islands) and hence involved an easily
manageable number of people; and it displayed
several weeks of increasing precursory activity
which permitted emergency arrangements to be
put in place. Moreover, a plan to manage vol-
canic crises was in place before the eruption and
therefore, while the scientiﬁc management of the
crisis presented challenges, the operational
management of the crisis ran smoothly. Good
fortune certainly helped the smooth operation
and, had the 2011 eruption occurred inland, or
with brief precursory signals, the consequences
might have been more serious.
The difﬁculties in scientiﬁc management
stemmed mainly from a non-inclusive policy
established by the national government, lack of
experience, differences in organisational cultures,
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lack of formal procedures for the sharing of
information and the under-funding of monitoring
networks. As demonstrated by the success of
analogous procedures at Etna and Stromboli, the
CSEV model to produce for the Canary Islands a
more inclusive scientiﬁc advisory group is a
positive step towards establishing a more inte-
grated and collaborative volcanological research
community. For successful implementation, the
model needs to accommodate four key features.
Financing aspects to ensure that participants
are not excluded because of lack of funding, not
only for data collection and hazard mitigation, but
also for the logistics of attending pre- sin- and
post- eruption meetings of the advisory commit-
tee. One promising option would be to adapt the
Table 1 Summary of selected characteristics of the case studies, good practice actions and lessons learnt
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Italian system of providing funds through the
national Civil Protection. In the longer term,
funding is required to establish permanent and
multidisciplinary monitoring networks, including
local monitoring centres responsible for speciﬁc
volcanoes in the Canaries. The centres provide a
focus for liaising in particular with local com-
munities and the Civil Protection. It is of course
much easier to justify the necessary resources at
frequently-erupting volcanoes, such as Etna and
Stromboli. However, having at least a contin-
gency for the rapid establishment of a multidis-
ciplinary inclusive institution will encourage the
coordination and sharing of data and contribute to
the feeling of cohesion and camaraderie amongst
the groups involved.
Legal aspects to protect against liability
exposure (Marrero et al. 2015). Aspinall and
Sparks (2004) describe an example from the
United Kingdom Ofﬁce of Science and Technol-
ogy, which includes a clause that “appears to
indemnify individual members of such a [scien-
tiﬁc advisory] Committee” when acting “hon-
estly, reasonably, in good faith and without
negligence”, although they warn that the phrase
“without negligence” is subjective and can be lead
to further disputes (quotations from Aspinall and
Sparks (2004) pp. 5–6).
Aspects of the format and storage of infor-
mation, to ensure the effective sharing of data.
Examples include:
a. Type of data that should be shared between
scientiﬁc groups, such as real time data, fast
data, general data-forecasts, and rock and gas
samples.
b. The content of scientiﬁc reports. On some
occasions data would have to be part- pro-
cessed before being shared in order for
non-specialists to understand and be able to
use it.
c. The frequency of delivering information, to
establish how often data are to be received
from each group. These timings should be
flexible and realistic. For instance, the
requirement of the Spanish Civil Protection to
receive written forecasts two days in advance
of a meeting may be neither feasible nor
helpful, especially if daily meetings are
required (following the procedures estab-
lished at Etna and Stromboli).
d. The format preferred by recipients for the
communication of forecasts, eruption scenar-
ios and mitigation procedures.
e. Policies on the storage of information to
decide which agency should be responsible
for compiling and storing scientiﬁc data, the
form of storage (e.g., as an electronic data-
base, or as a website with restricted access),
and the length of storage before data are made
available for general use.
Procedures for integrating researchers from
outside ofﬁcial monitoring groups. Volcanic
eruptions provide opportunities for advancing the
understanding of volcanic processes and, as
identiﬁed by IAVCEI et al. (1999), establishing
ofﬁcial and legal mechanisms to allow external
research groups access to ﬁeld data can yield
insights of potential value to mitigation efforts. It
would also reduce the possibility of ill feelings
caused by exclusion.
6 Conclusions
Our experience of emergencies at frequently-
erupting and long-dormant volcanoes, reinforce
the conclusions by IAVCEI et al. (1999) that the
management of crises is optimised by ofﬁcially
approving, before an emergency, clear, and leg-
ally binding rules and protocols for the com-
munication of scientiﬁc information between
responding groups. As well as detailing the type,
content, amount, format, frequency, storage and
use of the information, the protocols should
consider aspects such as conﬁdentiality, inclu-
siveness, ethics, ﬁnancing and legal aspects such
as the liability of scientiﬁc groups.
Another important recommendation is to
identify a coordinating body outside the moni-
toring and scientiﬁc teams—such as the Civil
Protection—to manage discussions, collate fore-
casts and scenarios and agree a consensus (or the
basis for different interpretations) and to ensure
that all involved feel that their views and
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contributions are respected. Recognising the
different organisational cultures of the respond-
ing groups is vital for a better understanding of
each party’s needs and limitations and for opti-
mising the design of communication strategies.
Finally, the Italian model demonstrates the
beneﬁts of establishing an on-site, inclusive and
multidisciplinary institution to produce and
coordinate scientiﬁc information and to encour-
age collaboration and camaraderie. It also illus-
trates the advantages of incorporating external
researchers, of sharing resources and of engaging
the public to improve the understanding of the
volcano in unrest. The allocation of appropriate
government funding and resources to all these
activities is, of course, key to their success.
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